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11 Introduction
The importance of literacy in the process of development is now widely accepted.
Firstly, the ability to read and write is valuable per se as it yields beneﬁts that
have great impact on everyday life. Secondly, literacy inﬂuences several other
aspects of human welfare: a number of empirical works record the impact of
literacy on fertility, child health and child mortality.1 Finally, literacy is an
important indicator of development: measures of literacy are used on their
own, or together with other social indicators to construct general indices of
development, such as the Human Development Index, the Human Poverty Index
and the Capability Failure Ratio.
Given this vast importance of literacy, it is a bit of an anomaly that the
measurement of literacy has not received the scrutiny and attention that has
been directed to equality, poverty, and income. In fact, the standard measure
used in the literature for measuring literacy is the Literacy Rate, computed as
the percentage of literates among adults.
Among the few critiques of this measure is the paper by Basu and Foster
(1998), which focuses on the fact that the Literacy Rate ignores that the presence
of a literate person in the household generates a positive externality that the
illiterate can beneﬁtf r o m . 2 The reasoning is that living with a literate can
1Among others, Stycos (1982) documents that literacy levels account for diﬀerence in
fertility rates. Murthi et al. (1995) show that literacy signiﬁcantly reduces fertility levels,
child mortality, and the gender bias in child mortality. Thomas et al. (1991) and Sandiford
et al. (1995) provide evidence that literacy improves the health of children.
2Basu and Foster point out that literacy may generate a negative as well as a positive
externality. In fact, becoming literate may alter the household bargaining power structure,
and be harmful for those who remain illiterate. If these eﬀects coexist, the positive externality
2be of great help to the illiterate; for instance, the former can read and write
letters on behalf of the latter, or can ﬁll job applications and read instructions
and prescriptions for him. To capture the fact that the proximate illiterate (one
who lives with at least one literate) has an advantage with respect to the isolated
illiterate (one who lives in a household with no literates), Basu and Foster assign
a positive externality α —aﬁx e dn u m b e ri nt h ei n t e r v a l( 0 ,1 )—t ot h ef o r m e r .
The idea is that each proximate illiterate counts for α literates, while each
isolated illiterate counts for 0 literates. Therefore, Basu and Foster derive the
Eﬀective Literacy Rate as the proportion of literates among adults, augmented
by the percentage of proximate illiterates multiplied by the externality α.3
It is however arguable that while the Basu-Foster measure is motivated by
an important concern, the actual measure they derive is inadequate. In their
speciﬁcation, the externality does not depend on the number of illiterates and
literates in the household. There are two points to be raised here. Firstly, in
the Basu-Foster framework the externality does not depend on the number of
illiterates as there is no rivalry in its consumption — the externality is regarded
as a sort of pure public good. It can be claimed, though, that if there are too
many illiterates in the household, the externality that each one can beneﬁtf r o m
is smaller. Secondly, the externality is assumed not to vary with the number of
literates. It can be contended, however, that the externality is increasing in the
number of literates for at least two reasons. For one, the presence of additional
literates implies greater availability of time on their part to provide literacy ser-
may be considered as representing the net eﬀect.
3The hypothesis of an external eﬀect of literacy seems to be borne out by the empirical
evidence: Gibson (2001) documents a strong eﬀect of adult proximate illiteracy on children’s
anthropometric measures; Basu, Narayan and Ravallion (1999) ﬁnd evidence that living with
at least one literate largely inﬂuences the illiterates’ earnings.
3vices to the illiterates. Additionally, each literate may embody distinct forms
of knowledge in conjunction with the basic literacy skills, and essentially pro-
vide a broader range of services to the illiterate. Indeed, Basu and Foster do
suggest that, in certain cases, the extent of the externality could depend on the
percentage of literates in the household.
Subramanian (2001) refers to this point and modiﬁes the eﬀective literacy
rate by setting the externality equal to the household literacy rate. The sug-
gested measure is appealing because it captures the idea of literacy being char-
acterized by positive returns and rivalry in consumption, but it has the disad-
vantage of not being supported by an axiomatic characterization. Building on
the idea that an unequal distribution of literacy across households determines
an eﬃciency loss, Subramanian puts forth a second index, constructed as the
product of the literacy rate and the percentage of people who are not isolated
illiterates. The advantage of this second measure is that, since its formulation
does not directly involve the externality, the index does not require a quan-
tiﬁcation of α, either empirically or by some assumption. On the other hand,
since the measure is constructed starting with the Basu-Foster formulation, it
assumes that the externality is ﬁxed and independent of the numbers of literates
and illiterates in the household and is therefore subject to the same critique.
In this paper I present the Distribution Sensitive Literacy Measure,ac l a s s
of literacy indices where the externality is a function of the ratio of literates
to illiterates in the household. This formulation captures the characteristics of
positive returns and rivalry in consumption of the externality and, therefore,
it deals with the criticism of the Eﬀective Literacy Rate discussed above. The
main contribution of this work is to show the equivalence between the proposed
4measure and a set of properties that are desirable for a literacy index. I believe
that an axiomatic characterization is essential to understand the priors that
underlie the measure, and hence crucial for choosing among diﬀerent indices.
To show that there is need for caution in the choice of the literacy measure, I
give an illustration of how diﬀerent indices of literacy provide diﬀerent rankings
of the nine South African provinces. This simple application conﬁrms that
diﬀerent indices may yield distinct evaluations of literacy in diﬀerent areas.
2 Distribution Sensitive Literacy
This section introduces some basic notation, reviews the existing literacy indices,
and presents the Distribution Sensitive Literacy Measure.
Let household h be composed by nh adults. Deﬁne its household literacy
proﬁle as the vector xh =( xh
1,...,x h
nh), where xh
j =1i ft h ejth member is
literate, and xh
j =0i ft h ejth member is illiterate. With a little abuse of
notation, at times I will refer to xh as the household having literacy proﬁle xh.
Let society x be a collection of mx households. Denote society x by the vector
of household literacy proﬁles x =( x1,...,x mx). For instance, if society x is
composed by three households of two, four and ﬁve people respectively, and
the literacy proﬁles of the three households are given by (0,0), (1,1,0,0) and
(1,0,0,1,1), then society x is deﬁned as x =( ( 0 ,0),(1,1,0,0),(1,0,0,1,1)).
Society x’s literacy proﬁle is denoted by x∗ and is deﬁned as the vector obtained
by concatenating the household literacy proﬁles. In the above example, society
x’s literacy proﬁle is: x∗ =( 0 ,0,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,1,1). Note that the society
literacy proﬁle hides the information on household structure: isolated illiterates
and proximate illiterates are not distinguishable.
5Let ∆ be the set of all societies and deﬁne a measure of literacy to be a
mapping L : ∆ → R from the set of all societies to the set of real numbers.
The Literacy Rate is a measure of literacy, R, which can be calculated as







The Literacy Rate is the simple percentage of literates among adults; it
ignores the household structure and therefore neglects the externality that the
proximate illiterate can beneﬁt from. In order to capture this externality, Basu
and Foster (1998) introduce household h’s eﬀective literacy proﬁle and deﬁne it
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j =0a n dxh
i =1f o rs o m ei
0i f xh
i =0f o re v e r yi
and 0 < α < 1 represents the externality that the proximate illiterate receives
when he lives with at least one literate. If household h’s literacy proﬁle is
xh =( 1 ,1,0,0), then its eﬀective literacy proﬁle is given by ˜ xh =( 1 ,1,α,α).
Society x’s eﬀective literacy proﬁle is denoted by ˜ x∗ and deﬁned as the vector
obtained by concatenating the household’s eﬀective literacy proﬁles; in the above
example, ˜ x∗ =( 0 ,0,1,1,α,α,1,α,α,1,1). Observe that the society eﬀective
literacy proﬁle conveys information on household structure; although it is formed
by the concatenation of household literacy proﬁles, it allows us to distinguish
between isolated illiterates and proximate illiterates.
The Eﬀective Literacy Rate is a measure of literacy, L∗,d e ﬁned as follows:







In this formulation, the proximate illiterate beneﬁts from the externality as
long as he lives with one literate person in the household. Additional literates
and illiterates in the household have no eﬀect on the magnitude of the exter-
nality. In contrast, this paper suggests that the importance of the externality
crucially depends on the numbers of literates and illiterates in the household.
To capture the relationship between the externality and the distribution of lit-
eracy, deﬁne household h’s distribution sensitive literacy proﬁle as the vector


















and rh = r(xh)=
P
j xh
j and sh = s(xh)=nh −rh are the numbers of literates
and illiterates in household h.4 Observe that, unlike in Basu and Foster’s work,
α now denotes a function.
Let N denote the set of natural numbers, let N be equal to N∪{0}, and denote
by Q+ t h es e to fn o nn e g a t i v er a t i o n a ln u m b e r s :Q+ ≡
©r
s : r ∈ N;s ∈ N
ª
.T h e
function α is assumed to have the following properties:
(i) α : Q+ → [0,1); α(0) = 0;
(ii) ∀p,p0 ∈ Q+,i fp0 >p ,t h e nα(p0) > α(p);
(iii) ∀p,p0 ∈ Q+ with p 6= p0,a n d∀λ ∈ Q+ ∩ (0,1), the following holds:





is a meaningful expression for s 6= 0 only. When the household is




need not be deﬁned.
7If household h’s literacy proﬁle is xh =( 1 ,1,0,0), its distribution sensitive
literacy proﬁle is given by ˆ xh =( 1 ,1,α(1),α(1)). By the same token, if society
x is given by x =( ( 0 ,0),(1,1,0,0),(1,0,0,1,1)), its society distribution sensi-









Notice that the society distribution sensitive literacy proﬁle conveys even more
information on the household structure: it is possible to identify isolated and
proximate illiterates, and also observe the distribution of literates and illiterates
across households.
The Distribution Sensitive Literacy Rate is a measure of literacy, ˆ L,w h i c h







Let H1 be the set of all households composed of literates only, and H2 be
the set of all households where there is at least one illiterate. By deﬁnition of
ˆ x∗
















The above expression is equivalent to
ˆ L(x)=
P
h (rh +ˆ α(rh,s h)sh)
nx
,










0i f s =0
Since the externality depends positively on the number of literates and neg-
atively to the number of illiterates, this formulation captures the characteristics
of positive returns and rivalry in consumption of the externality.
83 Axiomatic Characterization of the Distribu-
tion Sensitive Literacy Measure
In choosing among diﬀerent indices, knowing which properties each one satisﬁes
is of considerable value, because it helps us understand the acceptability of
each measure. Economists have identiﬁed a number of appealing axioms for
measures of poverty and inequality. Some of these properties are also attractive
for measuring literacy, and will be discussed here. This section presents a set
of axioms desirable for measures of literacy, and shows that the Distribution
Sensitive Literacy Measure is the only class of literacy indices which satisﬁes
them all.
The ﬁrst property relates literacy in society x to literacy in its subsocieties.
Societies y,z ∈ ∆ are said to be subsocieties of x ∈ ∆ if yh = xh for 0 ≤
h ≤ my,a n dzh = xmy+h for 0 ≤ h ≤ mz,w i t hmy + mz = mx.T h a t i s , y
and z are subsocieties of x if they are obtained by splitting society x in two,
maintaining the household structures unchanged. The following axiom requires
the overall literacy to be a weighted sum of literacy in its subsocieties, with the
weights being their population shares. Such choice of weights implies that, in
constructing the index, each individual counts the same in contrast, for instance,









Because any subsociety is a society itself, it can be decomposed further, as
long as it is composed of more than one household. Since the smallest subsoci-
9eties are the single households, applying axiom D repeatedly implies that the
overall literacy is a weighted sum of literacy in each household, with the weights
being the population shares of each household.
It is worth noting that the Decomposition axiom implies household anonymity:
even if society x is split in more than two groups, and even if the households or-
dering is not maintained, its overall literacy is still the weighted sum of literacy in
the groups. In fact, both literacy in the society as a whole and the weighted mean
of literacy in the groups in which the society is split can be shown to be equal to
the weighted sum of literacy in each household. For instance, consider society
x = ((1,1,0,0,0),(1,0),(0,1),(1,0,1,1),(1,1,1)) and split it in the following
way: y =( ( 1 ,1,0,0,0),(1,0,1,1)), z = ((0,1),(1,0)), and w =( ( 1 ,1,1)). Ap-












































The Decomposition axiom rules out the existence of inter-household exter-
nalities. There are surely cases where literates generate an externality to the
illiterates living in a proximate household, but this can be easily accommodated
in the same framework, carrying the analysis in terms of units larger than the
household.
The second axiom requires the index to increase as one illiterate person
becomes literate, while the literacy of the others and the household structures
are unaﬀected. Society x ∈ ∆ is obtained from society y ∈ ∆ by a simple
increment if xh
j =1a n dyh
j = 0, while xh0
j0 = yh0
j0 for all (h0,j0) 6=( h,j).
10M (Monotonicity): If x ∈ ∆ is obtained from y ∈ ∆ by a simple increment,
then L(x) >L (y).
The third axiom normalizes the measure, so that it is bounded by 0 and 1.
Society x ∈ ∆ is completely literate if everyone is literate, i.e. if xh
j =1f o ra l l
(h,j); it is completely illiterate if everyone is literate, i.e. if xh
j =0f o ra l l( h,j).
N (Normalization): If x ∈ ∆ is completely literate, then L(x)=1 ;i fx ∈ ∆
is completely illiterate, then L(x)=0 .
It is worth noting that both the Literacy Rate and the Eﬀective Literacy
Rate satisfy the above three properties. The axiom which is crucial to the
formulation of the Distribution Sensitive Literacy Measure is the following one.
It is concerned with the distribution of literacy across households, and requires
the measure to penalize societies with unequal distribution of literacy.
Society x ∈ ∆ is uniform if every household has the same number of literates
and every household has the same number of illiterates. Society y ∈ ∆ has
perfect literacy equality if either y is uniform or it can be formed by starting
with a uniform society and merging some of its households.
Q( E q u a l i t y ) : Suppose that societies x,y ∈ ∆ have the same number of
literates and the same number of illiterates. If x has perfect literacy equality,
then L(x) ≥ L(y). If in addition y does not have perfect literacy equality, then
L(x) >L (y).
The Equality axiom introduces a distributional concern in the measure of
literacy.
The Literacy Rate is indiﬀerent to any distributional matter. In particular,
11according to this measure, as long as the numbers of literates and illiterates
are the same, a society with perfectly equitable distribution of literacy across
households and a society with polarization of literates and illiterates are equally
desirable.
The Eﬀective Literacy Rate is not concerned with an equal distribution of
literacy per se, but it favors an egalitarian distribution since it maximizes the
beneﬁt from the externality. However, this is only partially true: when there
is at least one literate person in each household, improving the distribution of
literacy across households has no eﬀect.
The Distribution Sensitive Literacy Rate maintains that the distribution of
literates across households matters, but pushes this further by claiming that
spreading literates and illiterates across households maximizes the beneﬁtf r o m
the externality, even when each household already has one literate member.
The Equality axiom captures the idea that increasing the number of literates
has a positive eﬀect on the externality, while increasing the number of illiterates
has a negative eﬀect. It should be noted that aiming to an equal distribution
of literacy across household stems from an eﬃciency concern: an egalitarian
distribution is seen to maximize the beneﬁt from the externality, and is therefore
desirable even if we were not concerned with equity in itself.
It will now be shown that the Distribution Sensitive Literacy Measure is the
only class of literacy indices that satisﬁes the above four properties.
Lemma 1: Consider two single household societies xh,yh ∈ ∆.I fam e a s u r e








Proof. Suppose r(xh)=r(yh)a n ds(xh)=s(yh). Since xh and yh have the
12same numbers of literates and illiterates, and they both have perfect equality,




















Lemma 1 shows that the Equality axiom entails individual anonymity within
the household: what matters for the household literacy measure is the number of
literates and illiterates, while the order in which the individuals are listed in the
household is irrelevant. For instance, household xh =( 1 ,0,0,1) and household
yh =( 0 ,1,1,0) have the same literacy measure, even though the members who
are literate are not the same in the two households.
Lemma 2: Consider two single household societies xh,yh ∈ ∆.I fam e a s u r e








Proof. Suppose r(xh)=kr(yh)a n ds(xh)=ks(yh). Consider society y ∈ ∆
composed of k households which are identical to yh.S i n c exh and y have the
same numbers of literates and illiterates, and they both have perfect equality,
axiom Q implies that L
¡
xh¢













Lemma 2 makes evident that the Equality axiom involves population inde-
pendence within the household: replicating the same number of times all the
individuals in the household has no eﬀect on its literacy measure. For instance,
households xh =( 1 ,0,0,1) and yh =( 1 ,1,0,0,0,0,1,1) have the same literacy
measure.
The Literacy Rate and the Basu-Foster measure both satisfy the Anonymity
and the Population Independence axioms.
13The central result of this paper may now be stated:
Theorem: A measure of literacy L satisﬁes axioms D, M, N,a n dQ if and









if sh 6=0 ,a n dα is a function
which has the properties (i)-(iii) listed above.
Proof. Let L be a measure of literacy which satisﬁes axioms D, M, N,a n d
Q. Consider any society x ∈ ∆ of size nx,a n dl e tr = rh and s = sh be the
numbers of literates and illiterates in household h. First, I will show that L(x)
can be written as
P
h(rh+ˆ α(rh,sh)sh)












order to determine the form of L(x), there is need to study the form of L(xh)
only. In fact, if it is possible to show that L(xh)c a nb ew r i t t e na s
rh+ˆ α(rh,sh)sh
nh ,










nx = ˆ L(x).
Deﬁne f : N×N → R and ˜ α : N×N → R as follows: f(r,s) ≡ (r + s)L(xh)a n d
˜ α(r,s)=
f(r,s)−r
s . Since Lemma 2 implies that f(kr,ks)=kf(r,s), it follows




.N o w ,
deﬁne ˆ α : N × N → R










0i f s =0
For all households, we have that L(xh)=
f(r,s)






For s =0 ,a x i o mN implies L
¡
xh¢
=1 ,a n dt h e r e f o r ef(r,s)=rh. Hence, for





rh +ˆ α(rh,s h)sh
nh
.
It will now be proved that: (i) α : Q+ → [0,1) ; α(0) = 0; (ii) ∀p0,p∈ Q+,
14if p0 >p ,t h e nα(p0) > α(p); (iii) ∀p,p0 ∈ Q+ with p 6= p0,a n d∀λ ∈ Q+∩(0,1),
the following holds: α(λp +( 1− λ)p0) > λα(p)+( 1− λ)α(p0).
(i)∀p ∈ Q+, ∃r ∈ N and s ∈ N s.t. p = r
s.I f p =0 ,t h e nα(0) =
f(0,s)
s by
deﬁnition. Since f(0,s) = 0 because of axiom N, we directly obtain α(0) = 0. If
p>0, then α(p)=
f(r,s)−r
s .A x i o m sQ and D imply f(r,s) >f (r,0) + f(0,s).
Next, applying axiom N, we get f(r,s) >rwhich implies α(p)=
f(r,s)−r
s > 0.
Axiom M yields f(r,s) <f(r+1,s−1) and, by induction, f(r,s) <f(r+s,0).
Applying axiom N, we get f(r,s) <r+ s and therefore α(p)=
f(r,s)−r
s < 1.
Thus, 0 ≤ α(p) < 1 as desired.
(ii)∀p,p0 ∈ Q+, ∃r,r0 ∈ N and s,s0 ∈ N s.t. p = r
s and p0 = r0
s0. Without loss





> α(0) = 0 directly follows from
(i). If p>0, r0
s0 > r
s implies r0s − rs0 > 0. Consider a society x composed of
one household with r0s literates and s0s illiterates, and a society y composed by
two households: one having rs0 literates and s0s illiterates, and the other having
r0s − rs0 literates only. By axioms Q and D, f(r0s,s0s) >f (rs0,s 0s)+f(r0s −
rs0,0) and applying axiom N we get f(r0s,s0s) >f (rs0,s 0s)+r0s−rs0.W i t ha














s0,a n dλ = u
w. Therefore, it is possible to write






















f (urs0 + wr0s − ur0s,wss0) − urs0 − wr0s + ur0s
wss0 .
Since by axioms Q and D we have that f (urs0 + wr0s − ur0s,wss0) >f(urs0,uss 0)+
15f (wr0s − ur0s,wss0 − uss0), we obtain
α(λp +( 1− λ)p0) >
f (urs0,uss 0) − urs0
wss0 +





















Therefore, α(λp +( 1− λ)p0) > λα(p)+( 1− λ)α(p0) as desired.
To complete the proof, one can check that ˆ L satisﬁes axioms D, M,a n dN.
To see that ˆ L satisﬁes Q, consider a society x ∈ ∆ composed of m identical
households, each one having r literates and s illiterates, and a society y ∈ ∆
composed of mr literates and ms illiterates belonging to n households. Since























,w i t h




sh00 that is, if society y ∈ ∆ does not
have perfect literacy equality. Since
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, i.e. ˆ L(x) ≥ ˆ L(y), with strict inequality if y ∈ ∆ does not
have perfect literacy equality.
The index obtained by setting the externality equal to the household literacy
rate belongs to the class of distribution sensitive literacy indices. In fact: (i)
r











s+1 is a concave function
of r
s.
Other functions of r





,w i t ha<1











transformation of the logistic cdf.
The above expressions imply diﬀerent concavities and, therefore, assign dif-
ferent penalties to unequal distributions. Since the more concave α is, the more
16penalized are the societies where literacy is unequally spread across households,
the choice of α may be crucial in determining the ordering of societies.
As an example, consider the following societies: x =( ( 1 ,1,0),(1,1,0,0,0));
y =( ( 1 ,0,0),(1,1,0,0,1)). The axioms alone do not allow to tell which society
has higher literacy. Now, consider the following three indices, belonging to the




































nx . According to ˆ L1,s o c i e t yx
has higher literacy; according to ˆ L2, the two societies are equivalent; according
to ˆ L3,s o c i e t yy has greater literacy.
In general, the axioms alone do not provide a complete ordering over the set
of all societies. Mitra (2001) characterizes those situations in which societies are
ranked the same way regardless of which index is chosen among those satisfying
a set of axioms he proposes. The axioms he suggests can be shown to be slightly
weaker than those proposed here. In particular, Mitra’s positive externality and
scale invariance axioms together are slightly weaker than the equality axiom used
in the present analysis.
4 Literacy in South Africa
This section provides an application of the diﬀerent measures of literacy to the
nine provinces of South Africa. The data set I use is the 1999 October House-
hold Survey (OHS). The survey gathered detailed information on approximately
140,000 people living in 30,000 households across the country. There are two
questions on literacy:
1. Can ...read in at least one language?
2. Can ...write in at least one language?
17I use both questions and deﬁne a literate person as one who is able to read and
write.
For the nine South African provinces, I compute the standard Literacy Rate,
the Eﬀective Literacy Rate (α =0 .25), and the Distribution Sensitive Index
(α = r
n). Among the functional forms suggested for the externality, α = r
n is
an intermediate choice in terms of cost of inequality.
As the results in Table 1 indicate, the ranking of provinces is sensitive to
the choice of the index.
Table 1
Literacy Rate Eﬀective Literacy Distribution Sensitive
Index1 Index2
Gauteng 0.939 Gauteng 0.947 Gauteng 0.959
Western Cape 0.927 Western Cape 0.934 Western Cape 0.952
Eastern Cape 0.872 Eastern Cape 0.892 Eastern Cape 0.924
Free State 0.866 Free State 0.888 Free State 0.921
KwaZulu-Natal 0.848 KwaZulu-Natal 0.870 KwaZulu-Natal 0.904
Northern Cape 0.834 North West 0.856 Northern Province 0.895
North West 0.831 Northern Cape 0.855 Mpumalanga 0.891
Mpumalanga 0.811 Mpumalanga 0.845 North West 0.889
Northern Province 0.809 Northern Province 0.844 Northern Cape 0.888
Source: South Africa October Household Survey 1999
1 The Eﬀective Literacy Rate is computed for α =0 .25.
2 The Distribution Sensitive Literacy Rate is computed for α = r
n.
In South Africa, the Literacy Rate is higher than 80% in all provinces; where
it is higher than 85%, the externality does not have a major eﬀect, and the
ranking is the same no matter which index is chosen. However, the ranking
18changes sharply for the 4 provinces where the Literacy Rate is the lowest. In
fact, note that for the last four provinces the Distribution Sensitive Index exactly
reverses the ranking of the literacy rate measure. This suggests that the use
of the Distribution Sensitive Index is crucial in less developed countries, where
literacy is particularly low. The data suggest that literacy is unequally spread
across households in the province of Northern Cape in particular. Although the
Literacy Rate for this province is the sixth highest, the Distribution Sensitive
Index is the lowest.
Some of the ﬁrst empirical tests of the externality thesis show that literacy
becomes a better predictor of diﬀerent aspects of human welfare once we allow
for a positive externality as in the Basu-Foster framework, but this in turn alerts
us to the possibility that we can do even better if we measure literacy by the
Distribution Sensitive Index developed in this paper.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I have built on the idea that the externality generated by the
presence of literates in the household presents characteristics of positive returns
and rivalry in consumption.
Recognizing that the numbers of literates and illiterates in the household
have a role in determining the externality, I have suggested a measure of literacy
that depends on the distribution of literacy across households. I showed that
this measure — the Distribution Sensitive Literacy Rate — is fully characterized
by four properties, three of which are also satisﬁed by the Literacy Rate and
the Eﬀective Literacy Rate.
The property that distinguishes the Distribution Sensitive Literacy Rate
19from other measures is the Equality axiom, which considers the issue of distri-
bution in the measure of literacy. The Equality axiom pushes further the idea
that the targeting of isolated illiterates is favorable for purposes of eﬃciency,
supporting the view that spreading literates and illiterates across households
maximizes the beneﬁt from the externality. The targeting of isolated illiterates
is still valid, but once there is at least one literate member in each household,
we should aim to have as egalitarian a distribution as is feasible. It should be
noted that such a recommendation stems from an eﬃciency concern: an egal-
itarian distribution is desirable even if we were not concerned with equity in
itself, because it is seen to maximize the beneﬁt from the externality.
Using data from the October Household Survey, I have shown that the rank-
ing of literacy across South African provinces is sensitive to the choice of index.
This provides a word of caution that diﬀerent indices may yield varying evalua-
tions of the literacy levels in diﬀerent areas. This in turn may imply contrasting
determination of priorities for policy intervention, or a diﬀerent assessment of
progress over time.
The choice of the externality function is crucial in determining the ordering:
the more concave the externality function is, the more penalized are societies
where literacy is unequally spread across households. Refraining from making
any value judgment, the choice of the functional form for the externality should
be determined empirically.
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